Abstract Using Shamir's secret sharing scheme to indirectly share the identity-based private key in the form of a pairing group element, we propose an efficient identity-based threshold decryption scheme from pairings and prove its security in the random oracle model. This new paring-based scheme features a few improvements compared with other schemes in the literature. The two most noticeable features are its efficiency, by drastically reducing the number of pairing computations, and the ability it gives the user to share the identity-based private key without requiring any access to a private key generator. With the ability it gives the user to share the identity-based private key, our ID-based threshold decryption (IBTD) scheme, the second of its kind, is significantly more efficient than the first scheme, which was developed by Baek and Zheng, at the expense of a slightly increased ciphertext length. In fact, our IBTD scheme tries to use as few bilinear pairings as possible, especially without depending on the suite of Baek-Zheng secret sharing tools based on pairings.
Introduction
In identity (ID)-based cryptography [1] , the user's identity is used as the public key. Hence, a certificate for certifying the public key is not needed. The secret key based on the user's identity is issued by a trusted authority called private key generator (PKG) . Since the ID-based encryption (IBE) scheme was first proposed in 2001 [2] , many ID-based cryptographic schemes have been proposed [3] . Bilinear pairing [2] is the most popular tool for designing ID-based cryptographic schemes.
Threshold cryptography [4] [5] [6] [7] mainly aims to enhance the protection against an attacker that wants to compromise secret keys. For example, in a threshold public-key decryption system [4, 6] , the decryption key is split into shares for a set of n users (or servers). In such a system, a ciphertext can be decrypted only if at least t users cooperate, where t is the threshold value. In recent years, some extended cryptographic tools of threshold cryptography, such as fuzzy identity based or attribute-based cryptography, have been widely applied to cloud security [8, 9] .
A combination of these two concepts results in the concept of ID-based threshold decryption (IBTD) schemes. It is a very useful cryptographic primitive in practice [10] . A possible application of such an IBTD scheme is in the scenario where the identity denotes the name of a group whose decryption key is shared by its members. As another application, it can be used to construct a mediated ID-based encryption scheme [10, 11] .
First, we focus on identifying whether the PKG or the user himself is the dealer responsible for distributing the private key of the identity for IBTD. In traditional IBC, the PKG is the holder of all private keys, implying some risk if its security is compromised. To avoid such a scenario, Boneh and Franklin [2] proposed the threshold method, wherein the master key is distributed among n PKGs. Then, a user can get his private key by obtaining more than t shares from different distributed PKGs. Following this idea, Boneh et al. [12] extended the IBE scheme [13] by adding the key sharing algorithm and the key recovery algorithm. As further extensions, in [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] , the threshold decryption function was considered. However, in these schemes, the user cannot share his private key by himself, but has to ask the PKG to complete this task because the algorithm for sharing the private key depends on the master key.
Next, we focus on the efficiency problem for IBTD. In the field of pairing-based cryptography, the computation of bilinear pairing is the bottleneck of the pairing application in practice [20, 21] . To solve this problem, designers try to use as few pairings as possible in designing cryptographic primitives [21, 22] . However, almost all previous threshold IDbased decryption schemes [10, [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] involve many bilinear pairings.
There are very few studies that address the functionality problem described above. In 2004, Baek and Zheng [10] considered the threshold decryption scheme wherein the shares of the ID-based private key D ID can be generated by the user himself. However, their method heavily relies on a suite of secret sharing tools that involve many more pairing computations compared to other IBTD schemes. On the other hand, to make pairing-based cryptographic algorithms more efficient, as discussed in [21] , the designer should pay more attention to the efficiency difference between the exponentiations in G 1 , G 2 , G T and the pairings for e : G 1 × G 2 → G T .
As can be inferred from the above discussion, it is interesting to design an IBTD scheme that features the functionality allowing the user itself to generate private key shares and involves as few pairings as possible. With this motivation, by introducing a new technique that indirectly shares a private key in the bilinear group by simply sharing an element in the finite field using Shamir's secret sharing scheme [23] , this paper proposes a new ID-based threshold decryption scheme from bilinear pairings that features the following advantages.
In terms of efficiency, compared with previous works, the proposed scheme uses significantly fewer bilinear pairings as compared to other algorithms. In fact, the fundamental difference between Baek-Zheng's method and ours is that, in the latter, each key share is an element in the finite field F p (our indirect method using Shamir sharing in the finite field) or an element in the bilinear group (Baek-Zheng direct method using extended Shamir sharing in groups). The improved efficiency makes our scheme suitable for some applications with limited computational resources, such as smart cards and wireless networks [24, 25] . Furthermore, this basic difference in private key shares means that Baek-Zheng's method has to completely depend on the pairings in the following algorithm steps, whereas our proposed scheme can complete the same functions by using computations in the finite field without depending on the pairings in many specific algorithm steps. For more details, refer to Baek-Zheng's construction presented in [10] . In terms of functionality, it is the holder of the private key associated with an identity rather than the PKG that will share the private key. Finally, the security proof is provided in the random oracle model. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we first review some preliminaries, which mainly include the basic properties of the pairings, the computational assumption on which our scheme is (indirectly) based, and the security notion of IBTD schemes. We then present our IBTD scheme in Section 3, prove its security in Section 4, and compare it with other IBTD schemes in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
Preliminaries

Bilinear pairing and complexity assumption
Definition 1 Both G and G T are groups with the prime order q, and P ∈ G is the generator, where G is an additive group and G T is a multiplicative group. A map e : G × G → G T is called a bilinear pairing if it satisfies the following conditions: (1) e is bilinear, i.e., e(aP, bP) = e(P, P) ab for all a, b ∈ Z * q ; (2) e is non-degenerate, i.e., e(P, P) 1, where 1 is the identity in the group G T ; (3) e is efficiently computable [2] .
Definition 2
Assume that G and G T are groups with the prime order q, P is the generator in G, and e : G × G → G T is a bilinear pairing. The attacker is seen as the probabilistic polynomial algorithm A BDH with the security parameter k as the input. Choose a, b, and c randomly from Z q and compute 
Security model
Definition 3
The ID-based (t, n)-threshold decryption scheme has the following algorithms [10] .
• System initialization algorithm Setup (1 k ) Given a security parameter 1 k , this algorithm outputs the system common parameters cp and the master secret key s. cp is made public, whereas s is kept secret.
• Private key extraction algorithm EX (cp, s, ID) Given an identity ID and a master key s, this algorithm computes the private key D ID , which is then secretly sent to the corresponding entity.
• Private key distribution algorithm DK(cp, ID, D ID , t, n) Given a private key D ID , the number of decryption servers n, and a threshold parameter t, this algorithm generates n shares {s i } n i=1 of D ID and some public parameters, mainly including a set of verification keys
. The key shares s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s n are sent to the decryption servers Γ 1 , Γ 2 , . . . , Γ n , respectively. These public parameters are used to check the validity of each private key share and decryption share.
• Encryption scheme E(cp, ID, M) Given a plaintext M ∈ {0, 1} l and an identity ID, this algorithm generates a ciphertext C. Here, note that, usually, the validity of the ciphertext can be publicly verified and the invalid ciphertexts will be rejected in the following algorithms.
• Decryption share generation algorithm D(cp, s i , C) Given a ciphertext C and a private key share s i , this algorithm first checks the validity of the ciphertext C. If C is invalid, it outputs "Invalid Ciphertext. " Otherwise, it outputs the decryption share δ i .
• Decryption share verification algorithm SV(cp,
, and a decryption share δ i , this algorithm first checks the validity of the ciphertext C. If C is invalid, it outputs "Invalid Ciphertext." Otherwise, it outputs "Valid Share" or "Invalid Share."
• Share combining algorithm SC (cp, C, {δ i } i∈Φ ) Given a ciphertext C and a set of decryption shares {δ i } i∈Φ (without loss of generality, we assume that there are at least t valid ciphertext shares in {δ i } i∈Φ ), this algorithm first checks the validity of the ciphertext C. If C is invalid, it outputs "Invalid Ciphertext." Otherwise, it then chooses t valid decryption shares by using the decryption share verification algorithm SV and finally outputs the plaintext M.
Following the work by Baek and Zheng, we now present the security notion for the IBTD scheme against a chosenciphertext attack [10] , which we call "IBTD-IND-CCA." We define the attacker A IBTD 's advantage as
Definition 4 Let
is at least when the running time, the time of the private key extraction queries, and the time of the decryption share generation queries are at most t, q e , and q d , respectively. The IBTD scheme is said to be IBTD-IND-CCA (t, q e , q d , )-secure if there is no (t, q e , q d , )-attacker against it.
Noninteractive zero-knowledge proof for the equality of two discrete logarithms
To make the validity of the ciphertexts and the decryption shares verifiable, we shall use a noninteractive zeroknowledge proof system for the equality of two discrete logarithms [6, 26] .
Let G be a group of order q with the generators g, g. Let EDLog g,g be the language of the pairs (u, u) ∈ G 2 such that log g u = log g u. Given (u, u) ∈ EDLog g,g , there exists r ∈ Z q such that u = g r , u = g r . To construct the noninteractive zero-knowledge proof (c, d) for the equality log g u = log g u, the prover randomly selects t ∈ Z q and computes 
In the random oracle model, this protocol is a noninteractive zero-knowledge proof for the language EDLog g,g .
Construction
Our IBTD scheme is based on the most popular ID-based encryption scheme created by Boneh and Franklin [2] . This IBTD scheme, called "IdThdBm" (ID-based threshold decryption scheme from a bilinear map), consists of the following algorithms.
• Setup (k) On input of the security parameter k, it performs the following steps:
(1) It generates the groups G and G T with the prime order q 2 k . It chooses a generator P of G and presents the bilinear pairing e :
2) It provides the cryptographic hash functions H 1 :
Here, the plaintext length l is a polynomial function in k. (3) It chooses the PKG's master key s uniformly at random from Z q and computes the PKG's public key P pub = sP. (4) It returns the common parameters cp = (G, G T , q, P, e, P pub , H 1 , H 2 , H 3 , H 4 , H 5 ) and keeps the master key s secret.
• EX (cp, s, ID) On input of the identity ID, it outputs Q ID = H 1 (ID) and returns the private key D ID = sQ ID .
• DK(cp, ID, D ID , t, n), 1 t n On input of the private key D ID , the decryption server number n, and a threshold parameter t, it shares D ID as follows:
and sets s = a 0 . (4) It confidentially transits the private key share s i to the server Γ i for 1 i n and broadcasts S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S n , S , S , and D ID among the n decryption servers (not system widely). Here, Γ i can verify the validity of these parameters.
Remark 1 (1) e(P, P) is added to the public parameters. Just like a precomputed value, it will be used in the following algorithms: DK, D, SV, and SC. (2) The algorithm DK involves no pairing computation. Furthermore, it results in fewer pairings in the following algorithms:
• E (cp, ID, M) On input of the message M ∈ {0, 1} l and the identity ID, it performs the following steps.
(1) It chooses a random integer r from Z q and computes
where K plays the role of a temporary encryption key.
(2) It computes U = rP, P = H 3 (U, V), and U = rP.
(3) To prove log P U = log P U, it randomly chooses t ∈ Z q and presents the noninteractive proof (c, d):
Here, note the following points: 1) The validity of the ciphertext C = (U, V, U, c, d) can be publicly verified by checking the equation c = H 4 (U, U, dP + cU, dP + cU), where P = H 3 (U, V). 2) Informally speaking, U and the above zero-knowledge proof can be seen as the digital signature of the message V under the public key U.
• D (cp, s i , C) On input of the decryption private key share s i and a ciphertext C = (U, V, U, c, d), the decryption server Γ i computes the decryption share δ i as follows:
(1) It verifies the validity of the ciphertext C by checking the equation c = H 4 (U, U, dP + cU, dP + cU), where
To show the equality of two discrete logarithms log Z Z i = log S S i , it randomly chooses t i ∈ Z q and computes the zero-knowledge proof (c i , d i ):
(4) Finally, it outputs the decryption share
• SV(C,
, the verification keys {S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S n }, the parameter S (recall that S = e(P, P)), and the decryption share δ i , it performs the following steps: (1) It first examines whether c = H 4 (U, U, dP+cU, dP+ cU), where P = H 3 (U, V). If C fails in the test, then it returns "Invalid Ciphertext". (2) Otherwise, it checks the following equality for
If δ i fails in this test, it returns "Invalid Shares." Otherwise, it accepts δ i .
• SC (cp, C, {δ i } i∈Φ ) On input of the ciphertext C = (U, V, U, c, d) and the decryption shares {δ i } i∈Φ , where
, it performs the following steps: (1) It first examines whether c = H 4 (U, U, dP+cU, dP+ cU), with P = H 3 (U, V). If C fails in the above test, it outputs "Invalid Ciphertext". (2) For i ∈ Φ, it examines the validity of each decryption share
), where Z = e(Q ID , U) until it obtains the t-th valid one. Without loss of generality, we assume that there exist at least t valid ciphertext shares and that Φ denotes the subset of t valid ones. 
Here, note that the above IBTD scheme is correct because
Security proof
Following the proof in [10] , for the security proof of our IBTD scheme IdThdBm, we first construct a non-ID-based threshold decryption scheme called "ThdBm," which is derived from IdThdBm. We first prove that the TD-IND-CCA security of ThdBm supports the IBTD-IND-CCA security of IdThdBm. Then, we prove that the BDH assumption implies the TD-IND-CCA security of ThdBm. Finally, we obtain the provable security result.
Owing to the similarity to Definition 3 for the IBTD schemes (essentially, a TD scheme is just an IBTD scheme without any key extraction), here, we shortly state the syntax of the threshold decryption (TD) schemes as follows. A TD scheme in the non-ID-based setting consists of a key/common parameter generation algorithm GK, an encryption algorithm E, a decryption share generation algorithm D, a decryption share verification algorithm SV, and a share combining algorithm SC. We first simply present the following TD scheme ThdBm derived from the IBTD scheme IdThdBm as follows:
• GK(k, t, n) On input of the security parameter k, the decryption server number n, and a threshold value t, the dealer performs the following steps:
(1) It chooses two groups, G and G T , with the same prime order q 2 k , and then a generator P of G, and provides the bilinear map e : G × G → G T .
(2) It determines the cryptographic hash functions H 2 : • E(cp, M) Given the plaintext M ∈ {0, 1} l , it randomly chooses r, t ∈ Z q and then computes K = e(rQ, P pub ). It • D (cp, s i , C) Given a private key s i of one decryption server and a ciphertext C = (U, V, U, c, d), the decryption server Γ i computes the decryption share δ i as follows. It checks the validity of the ciphertext C through the equation c = H 4 (U, U, dP + cU, dP + cU), where
and generates the zero-knowledge proof (c i ,
for the equality of two discrete logarithms log
, and t i is randomly chosen from Z q . Finally, the decryption share
• SV(C, V, U, c, d) , the verification keys {S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S n }, the parameter S , and a decryption share δ i , it checks the validity of C by c = H 4 (U, U, dP + cU, dP + cU), where P = H 3 (U, V), and then checks the validity of
• SC(cp, C, {δ i } i∈Φ ) On input of the ciphertext C = (U, V, U, c, d) and the decryption shares {δ i } i∈Φ , where |Φ| t and Next, we present the security notion "TD-IND-CCA" of the threshold decryption scheme [6, 10] . • A BDH randomly selectss ∈ Z q and sets
Definition 5 Let
Here, note that, if the unknown value s −s is denoted by s, then we have D = sQ − sQ, S 0 = e(P, P) s .
• Next, for 1 i t−1, A BDH randomly picks an element s i ∈ Z q as the key share of Γ i and sets the verification key S i = S s i , where S = e(P, P). F(x) ∈ Z q [x] is one polynomial with the degree (t − 1), which is implicitly determined by
Hence, we have
• For every integer k ∈ [t, n], A BDH simulates the k-th ver- According to the Lagrange interpolation formula 
where " R ←" means "is randomly chosen from," and then adds t * , (U * , V * ) to the empty list L 3 . For a query
is not in L 3 , A BDH randomly selects t i ∈ Z q , adds 
Phase 3 Suppose that A TD queries the k-th decryption share of the ciphertext C = (U, V, U, c, d) owing to the uncorrupted server Γ k , t k n.
• A BDH searches for a tuple t , (U, V) containing (U, V)
in the list L 3 . If it is not found, A BDH returns "Invalid
Ciphertext."
• A BDH searches for a tuple c, (U, U, W, W) containing
• Although A BDH cannot get r from U = rP, it can set U = rP and simulate the decryption of C. In fact, A BDH can calculate the temporary key K = e(Q, U)
• As the verification key S k in Phase 2 is simulated, k ∈ [t, n], A BDH simulates the k-th decryption share δ k .
(
Here, note that Z 0 = Z s because
A BDH randomly selects c k , d k ∈ Z q and sets the k-
where Z = e(Q, U). Now, it can be seen that this simulated ciphertext C can pass the validity checking. and provides them to A BDH . A BDH provides to A TD the target
, as shown below.
• U * , V * are defined in the initial step of simulating the random oracle H 3 and, thus, we have
• The other parts, U * , c * , and d * , are defined as
Here, note that In Phase 2, we show the following points: (1) The four random oracles, H 2 , H 3 , H 4 , and H 5 , are well simulated because all the responses are uniform and independent in the respective ranges. (2) The parameters s, F(x) are distributed as in the real attack. Then, the other parameters, D, S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S n and s 1 , . . . , s t−1 , are also perfectly simulated because they are defined by s, F(x). (3) Obviously, the other parameters, such as P pub , Q, and S , are generated as in the real attack.
In Phase 3, observe that, for the queried ciphertext 
Comparison
First, we explain why we need to compare the number of pairings, scalar multiplications in G, and exponentiation in G T for all relative algorithms. It is impossible to simply conclude how much the speed difference is between the scalar multiplication in the group G (or the exponentiation in G T ) and the bilinear pairing because the speed difference will get changed with the difference in the type of pairing, the security parameters, the type of underlying curves, the parameters of the curves such as the embedding degrees, etc. [20, [27] [28] [29] [30] . According to Tables 3 and 4 from [21] , it remains reasonable to say that the scalar multiplication in G (or the exponentiation in G T ) is remarkably faster than the pairing operation for most pairing-based cryptographic schemes. Therefore, our IBTD scheme tries to use as few pairings as possible, even at the expense of a smaller or the same number of exponentiations or scalar multiplications in the pairing groups. Next, we explain why we need to consider who (the PKG or the user himself) is the dealer responsible for distributing the private key of the identity for IBTD. For the common applications wherein the user needs to share the decryption key, by using the proposed IBTD scheme, the user himself can generate, distribute, and refresh the shares. In contrast, in most IBTD schemes in [15-19, 31, 32] , the user has to turn to the PKG dealer to do these. Hence, our IBTD scheme provides more convenience to users in such applications. In fact, as far as we know, our IBTD scheme and the Baek-Zheng IBTD scheme [10] are the only two IBTD schemes with this property.
In terms of security and functionality, we compare our IBTD scheme with other schemes as follows. Like the schemes in [10, 16] , our scheme is provably secure in the random oracle model under the BDH assumption. Like in the scheme in [10] , in our scheme, the user himself can share the private key, whereas the user in the scheme of [16] has to depend on the PKG to share the private key.
In terms of efficiency, the comparison between our IBTD scheme and the other schemes is as follows. In the field of pairing-based cryptography, the number of involved pairings in the algorithms is the most important efficiency index. As mentioned previously, we use some techniques to try to avoid using pairings when designing our IBTD scheme. Among these techniques, the indirect method for sharing the private key in a group is the main one. Let us consider the common application environment of ID-based threshold decryption, where each decryption server Γ i needs to check the validity of at least t − 1 decryption shares and one ciphertext, generate one decryption share, and combine t decryption shares. By the IBTD scheme from [10] , Γ i needs to compute 2t + 2 parings, 3t exponentiations in G T , and 0 scalar multiplication in G. By the IBTD scheme from [16] , Γ i needs to compute 2t parings, 3t exponentiations in G T , and 4 scalar multiplications in G. By our IBTD scheme, Γ i needs to compute 2 parings, 5t exponentiations in G T , and 4 scalar multiplications in G. Here, note that, we do not compare our scheme's efficiency with that of the IBTD schemes [18, 19, 31] , which are secure in the standard model. In fact, despite having a better security model, they are usually slower than those that are secure in the random oracle model.
Finally, we present Table 1 for the comparison of different IBTD schemes in terms of the number of pairings, exponentiations in G T , and scalar multiplications in G for each algorithm, security model (random oracle model or standard model), assumption, and dealer (the one who generates the key shares: the user or the PKG). 
Application and extension
First, our IBTD scheme is very suitable in cases where the user wants to share his private key among a number of decryption servers in such a way that any committee member can successfully decrypt the ciphertext if, and only if, the committee member obtains a certain number of decryption shares from the decryption servers. In this case, unlike in the IBTD schemes [16, 32] , the user can perform this process without asking the PKG to do so. In fact, this feature makes our IBTD scheme very similar to traditional threshold decryption schemes in non-id-based form.
Second, our IBTD scheme can be used as a building block for constructing a mediated ID-based encryption scheme [10] . The idea is to split a private key associated with the receiver's (say, Bob) ID into two parts and give one share to Bob and the other share to the security mediator (SEM). Accordingly, Bob can decrypt a ciphertext only with the help of the SEM. As a result, instantaneous revocation of Bob's privilege to perform decryption is possible by instructing the SEM not to help him anymore. Using the method of Beak et al. for constructing a mediated ID-based encryption scheme, one can construct a similar but more efficient scheme based on our IBTD scheme.
Third, as the main computation is the common group operations in the group G or G T and only very few pairings are involved during the decryption procedure, our IBTD scheme is very efficient and, hence, suitable for some resourcerestricted applications.
All in all, in addition to the basic "identity-based" feature, the main features of our IBTD scheme are its efficiency, by drastically reducing the number of pairing computations, and the ability it gives the user to share the identity-based private key without requiring any access to a PKG. These features are the main factors supporting more real applications than what other previous IBTD schemes support.
Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a new identity-based threshold decryption (IBTD) scheme from bilinear pairings. With this scheme, the user himself can distribute the private key among decryption servers, without bothering the PKG in the sharing procedure. This scheme uses much fewer bilinear pairings than what other IBTD schemes use in the involved algorithms at the expense of a slightly longer ciphertext length. The advantage in efficiency makes it suitable for some applications with limited computational resources, such as wireless networks and smart cards. All these properties are due to our new basic technique by which the private key in the bilinear group is indirectly shared through simply sharing an element in the finite field. As a future work, it is interesting to explore further applications of this new technique in threshold cryptography, such as ID-based threshold decryption in the standard model and hierarchical threshold decryption schemes.
